Resumen: Mientras que en Banquete Platón presenta a Éros como un daímon metaxý, i.e. como una divinidad intermedia e intermediaria entre dioses y hombres, en Fedro lo caracteriza, en cambio, como un theós -un dios. Procuraremos mostrar aquí que esto no implica, sin embargo, un cambio doctrinal substancial sino que se trata de dos aproximaciones distintas pero complementarias respecto a la verdadera naturaleza de Éros. Según el Fedro, si bien éros puede permanecer en una expresión puramente física, sin desarrollar su (...) aspecto divino, es posible también que, debido al intenso deseo sexual por el bello muchachito, el amante recuerde la Forma de la belleza y crezcan en él las alas del Éros divino. Pero únicamente los dioses nunca pierden las alas de sus almas y están regularmente en pleno contacto con las Formas. Las almas humanas deben adquirirlas, y aun así, con riesgo a perderlas, quedando entonces en un lugar “intermedio” -metaxý- como el Éros de Banquete.: Although in the Symposium Plato describes Erôs as a daimôn-metaxy, i.e. as an intermediate and intermediary divinity between gods and men, in the Phaedrus it is said that Erôs is a theos -a god. I will try to show that these different descriptions do not imply a substantial change of mind but work as two complementary views about the true nature of Erôs. According to the Phaedrus, although erôs can remain just at a physical level and not develop its divine power, it is also possible that, thanks to the same intense, sexual desire for the beautiful boy, the lover recollects the Form of beauty and so grows divine Erôs`s wings. However, only the gods never lose their wings and so are in regular, full contact with the Forms. The human souls need to acquire the wings and even so take the risk of losing them; they are then in an intermediate state -metaxy- like Erôs in the Symposium. (shrink)

Thinking together not only binds us, but also allows us to explore unknown, perhaps unknowable, territory with joy, curiosity and confidence. Through asking children what they in some sense already know through their intuitive knowledge and putting thinking itself into question, we can help them become more aware of themselves as thinking beings. And as thinking beings children can learn the skills they’re taught in school, but not at the expense of their own thinking. With their thinking intact, they can (...) skillfully apply what they learn in school to the world in which they live. (shrink)

'Ethics' was not developed as a separate branch of philosophy in Buddhist traditions until the modern period, though Buddhist philosophers have always been concerned with the moral significance of thoughts, emotions, intentions, actions, virtues, and precepts. Their most penetrating forms of moral reflection have been developed within disciplines of practice aimed at achieving freedom and peace. This Element first offers a brief overview of Buddhist thought and modern scholarly approaches to its diverse forms of moral reflection. It then explores two (...) of the most prominent philosophers from the main strands of the Indian Buddhist tradition – Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva – in a comparative fashion. (shrink)

IN THE LAST PART of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith puts his theory in a class with those of his contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, namely, the systems that make sentiments the principle of approbation. Despite recognizing important differences with both of them, he thinks that since he has placed the origin of moral sentiments in sympathy, and in particular the fact that we are able to enter into the motives of the agent and get pleasure from (...) finding them appropriate to their cause, sentiments are the foundation of his theory of morals. Many of Smith’s commentators, in fact almost all of the most important studies over the last few years, reaffirm the author’s self-description. However, my aim in this paper is to challenge this view by showing that Smith’s system can also be plausibly seen as a theory of practical reasoning, and in some important aspects very similar to Aristotelian ethics. Surprisingly few scholars have seen this parallel. Laurence Berns, Samuel Fleischacker, Charles Griswold, and Gloria Vivenza are the latest exceptions, identifying several points of coincidence between Adam Smith and Aristotle’s ethics. None of them, however, has tied all these similarities under a unified interpretation, such as the one I propose here: The basic analogy between these theories, and the source of those particular coincidences, is the operation of practical reason. Moreover, and besides the common elements with Aristotle’s ethics, Smith’s reconstruction of practical reason simultaneously announces some of the main features of modern accounts of ethics, such as impartiality and universality as preconditions of moral judgment. The integration of these ancient and modern elements in a single coherent theory allows Smith’s TMS to overcome the insufficiencies and paradoxes of both these traditions, and it constitutes one of the most interesting and challenging proposals of modern ethics. (shrink)

El debate en torno a Aristipo de Cirene, cuya concepción de la felicidad coloca en el centro de la escena al placer, pone en tela de juicio las afirmaciones propias de aquellas éticas nucleadas bajo el epíteto de eudemonistas. Con el desplazamiento de la felicidad del sitial del fin, Aristipo reformula la dimensión ética tradicional: a través del ejercicio de la enkráteia, y lejos de caer en un relativismo subjetivista, intenta construir una ética que tenga como base un objetivismo gnoseológico. (...) Demostraremos, además, que al ejercicio de la enkráteia cirenaica subyace la noción de autosuficiencia ( autárkeia ) –entendida en términos aristotélicos– del individuo . Esto nos enfrentará, irremediablemente, a la noción aristotélica de felicidad (en estrecho vínculo con la noción de enkráteia ), la cual no comporta una noción de autosuficiencia individual sino que restringe la posibilidad de la autárkeia a la autosuficiencia de la pólis. (shrink)

Jan WoleĔski Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in particular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is  ...

All methodologies used to characterize mother-infant interaction includes mother, infant, and other social factors. The chief difference is how each methodology selects certain elements of this interaction as relevant. I will argue that in the context of the mother-infant interaction a methodology’s results depend on the model’s presuppositions on the nature of communication. These presupposition affects the kinds of questions asked, the kind of data obtained, and how these data are analyzed. I will show this by contrasting two different analysis (...) of separation studies in infant primates: what I call the Ecological-Linear approach vs. Dynamic System Theory (DST) approach. (shrink)

Na análise do equilíbrio trabalho-família, tem-se salientado o efeito de extravasamento (spillover). Neste estudo, realizado por entrevista semiestruturada a uma amostra de 102 mães portuguesas (incluindo 79 sinalizadas por mau trato e negligência), abordam-se os impactos da situação profissional da..

O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em investigar o caráter inventivo da memória freudiana. Para Platão, a memória é pensada a partir de dois tempos, o da inscrição do traço e o de sua reminiscência, a relação que o traço mantém com a percepção é, desde então, problematizada. O filósofo grego, ..

A latência é o período do desenvolvimento menos abordado pela literatura psicanalítica e menos compreendido, apesar de corresponder à idade na qual ocorre a maior procura por atendimento psicológico. Além disso, questiona-se um possível encurtamento do período da latência em nossa cultura. Partindo ..